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ABSTRACT
Using Multi-agent Negotiation Techniques
for the Autonomous Resolution of Air Traffic Conflicts. (December 2004)
Steven Wollkind, B.A., Williams College
Chair of Advisory Committee: Thomas R. Ioerger
The National Airspace System in its current incarnation is nearing its maxi-
mum capacity. The Free Flight initiative, which would alter the current system by
allowing pilots to select more direct routes to their destinations, has been proposed
as a solution to this problem. However, allowing pilots to fly anywhere, as opposed
to being restricted to planned jetways, greatly complicates the problem of ensuring
separation between aircraft.
In this thesis I propose using cooperative, multi-agent negotiation techniques
in order to efficiently and pseudo-optimally resolve air traffic conflicts. The system
makes use of software agents running in each aircraft that negotiate with one another
to determine a safe and acceptable solution when a potential air traffic conflict is
detected. The agents negotiate using the Monotonic Concession Protocol and com-
municate using aircraft to aircraft data links, or possibly the ADS-B signal.
There are many benefits to using such a system to handle the resolution of air
traffic conflicts. Automating CD&R will improve safety by reducing the workloads
of air traffic controllers. Additionally, the robustness of the system is improved as
the decentralization provided by software agents running in each aircraft reduces the
dependence on a single ground based system to coordinate all aircraft movements.
The pilots, passengers, and carriers benefit as well due to the increased efficiency of
the solutions reached by negotiation.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Motivation
Maintaining separation between aircraft is an important task of air traffic con-
trollers. Controllers are assisted in this task by a national network of jetways to
which air traffic is currently confined. These jetways can be thought of as predefined
routes, or highways, through the national airspace system. Unfortunately, the jetway
system is an inefficient use of airspace, and current research indicates that with con-
tinuing increases of air traffic it will cease to be viable. In order to more efficiently
use the national airspace the system will need to become more flexible and open.
A NASA initiative currently being researched would allow pilots to chose their own
direct routes rather than relying on air traffic control and the jetway network.
The NASA initiative is known as “free flight” and it allows pilots to plot their
own preferred courses, free from external interference by ground control. This will
allow a more efficient use of airspace. Additionally, when aircraft are allowed to take
advantage of local weather and traffic conditions, the efficiency of their own flight
plans will be greatly increased. [8]
These benefits come at the cost of a significant increase in the difficulty of ensur-
ing safe separation between the aircraft in the airspace. The jetway network, while
inefficient, greatly reduces the complexity of the task of maintaining aircraft separa-
tion. As the national airspace is shifted from a constrained network of highways in
the sky to a system where pilots select their own routes, human air traffic controllers
may no longer be able to manually provide this separation.
For this and other reasons there has been a great deal of research into automating
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2the detection and resolution of air traffic conflicts. The majority of this research
has approached the problem from a non-cooperative, game theoretic angle. These
approaches often solve for solutions that will work in the worst case scenario. While
these methods produce viable solutions, they are far from optimal.
Goals
I propose applying multiagent negotiation techniques to the problem of air traffic
conflict resolution. By treating the aircraft as agents that are competing for the
limited resource of airspace, well known negotiation techniques can be applied to
achieve solutions that are of greater efficiency than those obtained by other methods.
By allowing aircraft to cooperate and negotiate to resolve their conflicts, two goals
will be accomplished. First, the aircraft will be able to resolve impending conflicts
without the assistance of a central ground control system. Secondly, inefficient worst
case scenario planning which is common in currently proposed systems will be avoided.
This thesis will demonstrate that multi-agent negotiation techniques can be effec-
tively applied to resolve air traffic conflicts and that the solutions generated by these
methods are more efficient than those created by traditional methods or alternative,
non-cooperative solutions.
Contributions
In spite of the fact that air traffic can be very naturally modeled with multi-agent
methods, this approach has not yet realized its full potential in air traffic research.
While there have been attempts to model aircraft as self interested agents, they have
been primarily focused on non-cooperative methods. One of the primary contributions
of this work is a demonstration that cooperative agent methods can be used to create
3solutions to problems within the air traffic control domain. This proof of concept
will help to establish multi-agent methodologies as a viable tool in the modeling and
solving guidance and navigation problems.
4CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
Conflict Detection and Resolution Systems
There has been a great deal of research in the last few years focused on automat-
ing the conflict detection and resolution (CD&R) process. While many conflict detec-
tion and resolution methods have been proposed, few have applied the techniques of
distributed artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems to the problem. Fewer still
have applied cooperative methods. Kuchar and Yang[4] provide an overview of 68 of
these systems and develop a taxonomy of conflict detection and resolution methods.
This taxonomy is a useful guide to the major issues that must be solved by such a
system and some of the standard ways in which those issues are approached.
The Kuchar and Yang taxonomy identifies six attributes of CD&R systems. They
are: dimensions of state information, method of dynamic state propagation, conflict
detection threshold, conflict resolution method, maneuvering dimensions, and man-
agement of multiple aircraft conflicts. Within each of these attributes there are several
basic classes into which CD&R systems can be classified. [4]
The dimensions of state information of a model are the spatial dimensions which
are considered for determining the positions of the aircraft involved. All CD&R
systems can be classified into those which consider purely horizontal state, purely
vertical state, or the full three-dimensional space. The majority of extant systems
fall into the latter category. [4]
Method of state propagation refers to how a model uses current state information
to predict future states. Conflict detection and resolution systems must be able to
detect future conflicts, predicting when and where they will occur. Clearly, in order
to perform these predictions the systems must extrapolate future positions of aircraft
5given current state information. There are several possible ways to do this, and
Kuchar and Yang outline three fundamental methods. These are nominal, worst-
case, and probabilistic. Nominal state propagation simply projects into the future
using the current course, speed, and position of the aircraft and does not account for
planned or unexpected course changes. Worst-case projection is nearly an opposite
of nominal projection. In a worst case projection it is assumed that any possible
maneuver might be made by the aircraft. The result is a set of possible trajectories,
rather than one. In this method, if any of the possible trajectories would cause a
conflict, then a conflict is predicted. Finally, probabilistic projection produces a set
of possible trajectories, each with a probability. These trajectories are projected into
the future and the probability of a future conflict is determined using the projections
and the likelihood associated with each one. It is worth noting that both nominal and
worst case projection are subclasses of probabilistic projection. In nominal projection
the aircraft follows its current course with probability 1, and in worst-case the aircraft
has an equal probability of making any possible course change. [4]
Models are also classified by their methods of determining when a conflict has
actually occurred. Some models use a simple distance threshold while others use
more complicated rule based systems to determine if two aircraft are actually in
danger of having a collision. Additionally, some systems do not define conflict, but
simply attempt to provide as much information as possible and assume that some
other system will condense that information into a decision about whether or not a
conflict is likely to arise. [4]
The methods by which models resolve recognized conflicts vary widely and are
categorized into five groups by Kuchar and Yang. The five classes are prescribed, opti-
mized, force field, manual, and no resolution method. Prescribed resolution methods
are determined and fixed at the time the system is created. They have the possible ad-
6vantage of being able to reduce response time via pilot training, but are generally less
efficient due to their “one solution fits all” approach. Optimized resolutions take var-
ious cost functions into account and determine a least cost maneuver which provides
the required separation between the aircraft. Force field solutions treat the aircraft
as a pair of charged particles and use electrostatic equations to determine possible
course trajectories. Manual resolution methods allow the pilot to create possible solu-
tions and receive feedback on their viability from the system. These solutions, while
being less automated and slower, allow for resolutions that are more appropriately
tailored to the particular conditions (terrain, weather) than the previous methods.
Finally, some models do not provide a resolution method. These models are primarily
concerned with the previously stated problem of conflict detection and assume that
a successful resolution will be calculated by some other system. [4]
Models which do provide some form of automated conflict resolution vary in the
types of maneuvers that are employed to resolve the conflicts. Classes of maneuvers
include turns, vertical moves, speed changes, and so forth. Models can allow for one
or several types of resolution maneuvers. Some models allow for combinations within
the same resolution. For instance, an aircraft could perform a climbing turn away
from a conflict. [4]
Finally, there are two ways in which a conflict resolution system can handle
conflicts between multiple (more than 2) aircraft. The model can explicitly handle
multiple conflicts, or it can repeatedly apply its standard pairwise resolution. Kuchar
and Yang point out that there are some cases in which a pairwise solution alone is
not sufficient to avoid conflict and that any model that is to be used in a real traffic
situation must have the explicit capacity to resolve conflicts between multiple aircraft.
[4]
Tomlin, Pappas and Sastry have published a number of papers on automated air
7traffic conflict resolution. They have developed a non-cooperative, distributed system
based on game theory. When a potential conflict is detected, the aircraft use a worst
case scenario analysis based on the pursuer/evader problem to plot a trajectory that
preserves separation regardless of the actions of the other plane. [13][14][15]
Kosecka, Tomlin, Pappas and Sastry have also done work to apply methods from
the field of robotics to the problem of air traffic management. There have been a large
number of studies into robot motion planning by the robotics community and some
of the theoretical methods that have been employed in those studies are applicable
for air traffic management. The authors draw the ideas of potential and vortex fields
from these classical robotics studies and apply them to the air traffic problem. They
also point out that algorithms embedded in time extended configuration space are
computationally difficult, and have been shown to be NP-complete under certain
circumstances. Additinally, a ’roundabout’ method is proposed for handing conflicts
between more than two aircraft. The solution employs flight paths similar to a rotary
style intersection. [2]
While the game theoretic worst case scenario approach does ensure separation
between the planes it does so at the cost of efficiency. Any system which is adversarial
in nature cannot produce optimal resolutions, as the solutions are based on worst case
analysis. In order to maintain the flexibility to respond to any possible course change
by the pursuer, the evader must trade away efficiency. Viable conflict resolutions that
are reached through cooperative methods will often be of higher utility to the aircraft
involved.
Wangerman and Stengel[16] presented a solution that does treat the aircraft as
negotiating agents, but this system also does not take advantage of the possibilities for
agent to agent communication. Their principled negotiation system involves agents
negotiating indirectly via a centralized controller which is responsible for ensuring the
8suggested trajectories do not conflict.
Menon, Sweriduk and Sridhar[5] developed a method which uses cost functions
which are similar to those that are found in agent based systems. However, their sys-
tem is based on quasilinearization optimization methods rather than agent to agent
negotiation. In the system aircraft trajectories are defined as sequences of four di-
mensional waypoints (three spatial dimensions and a temporal dimension) and various
parameterization methods. Using the parameterized representation of initial aircraft
trajectories, appropriate cost functions, and the sequential quadratic programming
method, optimal trajectories are computed. These new trajectories minimize the
overall cost of the system subject to the constraint that the aircraft not violate pro-
tected zones of other aircraft. The method developed can handle any number of
conflicting aircraft.
Prior work at Texas A&M has begun to focus on the idea of using agent systems
in air traffic management to resolve conflicts and perform other pilot advisory tasks.
[9][10][12] These methods have primarily focused on agents as advisers which monitor
the situation and provide the pilot with warnings or recommendations. In general
they do not communicate with other external agents or entities aside from the pilot.
Multi-agent Negotiation
Multi-agent negotiation is not a new field. The basic concepts on which the
protocols are based originate in economics and game theory and have existed for
50 years. Harsanyi [1] and Nash [6][7] did early work in this field. The multi-agent
system field is somewhat younger, but the basic papers in multi-agent negotiation date
from the mid 1980’s. In spite of the age of the field new methods of applying these
principles are constantly arising, and multi-agent techniques are only now gaining
9acceptance in some fields for which they are well suited. Recent contributors to this
field include Sarit Kraus [3] and Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein [18]. Zlotkin
and Rosenschein in particular are responsible for the negotiation protocol that is used
in the method proposed here: the Monotonic Concession Protocol.
Monotonic Concession Protocol
The monotonic concession protocol (MCP) is a simple protocol developed by
Zlotkin and Rosenschein[11][17] for automated agent to agent negotiations. The MCP
captures the incremental bargaining process that takes place between negotiating
parties. The agents iteratively make proposals and counter proposals of progressively
less value to themselves until a middle ground is reached that can be agreed upon by
both agents.
To begin an explanation of the MCP we must first introduce some notation. We
will denote the negotiating agents as A and B. At any moment each agent has some
plan that it is following. We will denote the agents’ plans as PA and PB. A Deal will
be defined as a pair of plans (PA, PB).
Each agent i has a utility function Utilityi which relates a plan of action to
a value representing the desirability of that plan for the agent. As it is useful to
discuss the utility of deals for the various agents we also define a utility function that
operates on deals. Given a Deal D = (PA, PB) then DealUtilityi(D) = Utilityi(Pi).
For example, DealUtilityA(D) is the value of UA(PA).
We will also define the negotiation set NS to be the set of all Deals which are
under consideration during the negotiation. The deals in the negotiation set have
an additional property that they are pareto optimal. A deal D = (PA, PB) is pareto
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optimal if there is no other deal D′ = (P ′A, P
′
B) for which
DealUtilityA(D
′) > DealUtilityA(D)
and
DealUtilityB(D
′) > DealUtilityB(D)
Note that D′ is preferred over deal D by both agents. Since both agents prefer D′ to D
the deal D is not pareto optimal and can be safely left out of the negotiation process.
Restricting the NS to pareto optimal deals ensures that we need not be concerned
at the end of the negotiation that there was some useful deal that was overlooked.
NS also contains the conflict deal. This is the deal that will be implemented if no
agreement is reached. This is usually the set of plans that the agents were operating
under before the negotiation began but this need not be the case (indeed, in the realm
of air traffic conflicts we will see that this is not an acceptable option).
The protocol begins (at t = 0) with each agent i proposing the deal from the NS
that maximizes the deal utility function for that agent. The proposals made by the
agents are simultaneous on each step. Once the proposals for a step have been made,
the agents have several options.
First, an agent may accept the deal proposed by the other agent. Let DA be the
deal proposed by agent A and letDB be the deal proposed by agent B. Agent B would
choose to accept the deal offered by A if DealUtilityB(DA) ≥ DealUtilityB(DB).
That is, if agent A offers a deal that is better for B than the deal that B suggested.
If both agents would be willing to accept the deal proposed by the other, one of the
two deals is chosen at random. The negotiation process ends when one of the agents
accepts a deal.
If neither deal is acceptable to both parties the negotiation continues. Each agent
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then decides whether to concede or stick to its last offer. This decision is made using
a calculation of risk based on the utility values of the various deals that are under
consideration. Intuitively, risk is defined as the ratio of how much utility is lost by
accepting the offer of the other agent to the amount of utility that is lost by causing
a conflict.
Formally, this is defined for agent A as
RiskA =
DealUtilityA(DA)−DealUtilityA(DB)
DealUtilityA(DA)−DealUtilityA(DConflict)
and similarly for agent B. This relationship is derived in[17].
If RiskA > RiskB then agent B should concede on this step. Both agents
calculate both risk values and decide accordingly whether to concede or hold. It is
important to note here that this definition of risk requires that the agents are aware
of each other’s utility values for the various deals that are under consideration. This
may lead to some concern that an agent could manipulate the negotiation system by
misrepresenting its utility values. It has been shown by Rosenschein and Zlotkin that
no advantage can be gained in this manner[11].
If an agent is to concede, it must determine which new deal from NS it should
propose. The appropriate strategy is to propose the minimum concession such that
the other agent will have to concede (if it is not also conceding on this step).
The strategy of beginning the negotiation by proposing the deal of minimal util-
ity to the other agent and proceeding with minimum sufficient concessions when
Riskself < Riskother is known as the Zeuthen Strategy. The Extended Zeuthen Strat-
egy is similar but contains some additional logic to take care of a special case that
can arise at the end of the negotiation[17].
It has been shown that the Extended Zeuthen Strategy will result in the agents
selecting the deal of highest product of utilities from the negotiation set. It has also
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been shown that this strategy is in equilibrium, meaning that if agents A and B are
negotiating, if agent A uses this strategy then agent B also prefers this strategy to
any other.[17]
The fact that this protocol has an equilibrium strategy is of key importance.
When a protocol has such a strategy it is not possible for the agents to gain an unfair
advantage by seeking alternate strategies. If any agent uses the equilibrium strategy
then the maximal payoff is obtained by other agents by using the same strategy. All
agents can safely use the equilibrium strategy without concern that another agent
can abuse the system to obtain a better result for itself at the expense of the others.
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CHAPTER III
METHODS
In order to demonstrate that a multi-agent system can be used to resolve air traf-
fic conflicts autonomously a simple air traffic simulation was created. The simulation
architecture used was the Texas A&M Multi-agent Intelligent Distributed Air Traffic
Simulation (MIDAS). The MIDAS architecture is reviewed more thoroughly below.
The various aircraft in the simulation were piloted by TRL (Task Representation
Language) agents which communicated with MIDAS via TCP socket connections.
Task plans were written for the TRL agents which enabled them to monitor
the airspace around them for potential conflicts. When an impending conflict was
discovered, the agents involved initiated a procedure for generating a set of possible
alternate courses. These course alternatives were then exchanged and each pair of
possible courses was checked for airspace conflicts. Any pair of courses that would
cause a future conflict was removed from consideration. Once this final negotiation
set was created the agents executed the monotonic concession protocol to select the
preferred resolution. Finally, the agreed upon resolution deal was implemented and
the aircraft flew the modified flight paths. The situation was then monitored to verify
that conflict did not, in fact, arise.
Several problems had to be solved to allow multi-agent negotiation techniques
to be applied to the air traffic conflict problem. The Monotonic Concession Protocol
(described above) requires a set of options, or deals, that the agents involved will
negotiate over. While some domains have very natural negotiation sets, the air traffic
conflict domain does not. A method was developed by which the agents created a set
of alternatives and determined which ones are viable after detecting an impending
conflict.
Additionally, negotiation protocols depend on utility functions. The agents must
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be able to determine which deals in the negotiation set are most desirable. Several
different utility functions were created and employed by the agents in the testing
process. Several safeguards were also developed and added to the protocol to ensure
that the process was reasonably robust with respect to plane to plane communications
failures and similar issues.
Finally, a number of simplifications were made to allow the problem to be solved.
They are enumerated at the end of this chapter and considered at more length as
possible areas of future research in the conclusion.
The MIDAS Architecture
For this and other aircraft simulation projects in conjunction with the Depart-
ment of Aerospace Engineering we have developed a distributed, low fidelity, air traffic
simulation system. When paired with autonomous agents which pilot some or all of
the aircraft in the system we refer to it as the Multi-agent Intelligent Distributed Air
Traffic System, or MIDAS for short.
MIDAS is an extension of a simple, generic simulation system written in Java.
The base simulation system consists of a class which keeps track of elapsed time and
a list of objects which have been registered for simulation. These objects within the
simulation are based on a generic class with a method for performing time based
updates on the simulated object. On each simulation cycle the central simulator calls
the update method on each of its registered objects and informs them how much time
has elapsed. The objects are then responsible for computing whatever dynamics are
required to update their states appropriately.
The other primary facility provided by the central simulation class is a simple
socket server. The simulator class opens a TCP socket for listening at startup time.
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On each simulation cycle the server checks for incoming messages and processes them
appropriately. This allows for a wide variety of client programs to connect and interact
with the simulation. Two examples relevant to this work are a simple visualization
program which displays the locations of the aircraft within the simulation and the
agent pilots themselves, which ’drive’ the aircraft via commands sent to the central
server.
The MIDAS specific extensions to the simulation enable it to be used as a simple,
low fidelity, air traffic simulator. A number of subclasses of the simulator object were
written to handle aircraft specific data and dynamics. Additionally, these classes
provide “driver” methods that allow agent processes to connect and “fly” the plane,
allowing the decision making to be encoded in an intelligent agent plan while still
making use of the existing simulation architecture.
TRL Agents
The TRL agent architecture was used to create the intelligent agents that carried
out the negotiation and piloting processes. These agents evaluate simple task plans
which are written with Lisp-like syntax. They are capable of direct communication
between one another via Java remote method invocation.
The primary power of the TRL agents is in their underlying inference engine.
TRL agents use the Java Automated Reasoning Engine, or JARE, to store facts in
first order horn clauses and perform logical inference using back-chaining.
16
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Conflict Detection and Resolution System Overview
Figure 1 provides an overview of the CD&R process described in the following
sections. The process begins with agents constantly monitoring the traffic situation
in their area and uses nominal state propagation to check for impending conflicts.
The agents look 20 minutes into the future when predicting conflicts. If the agent
determines that a conflict is going to occur, the agent initiates negotiation with the
aircraft in question.
The agent initiates negotiation by sending a message to the other aircraft that
an impending conflict has been detected. The agent then uses a prescribed procedure
to generate a number of possible alternate trajectories. Each of these trajectories is
then evaluated using the flight plan cost function of the agent to determine a cost,
which is then compared to the cost of the fall back trajectory to determine a utility
score.
Each alternate trajectory and its associated utility score is then sent to the
aircraft with which conflict is impending. At the same time, the agent receives the
other aircraft’s possible trajectory alternatives and utility functions. Each of these
trajectories is paired with each of the agent’s own trajectories to produce 36 potential
deals.
It is possible that some or all of these deals will not be conflict free. Therefore,
each deal is checked, using a nominal state propagation method, to ensure that no
conflict will arise if that deal is implemented. Any deal that is not conflict free is
then rejected. Once this process is complete the negotiation set has been generated.
After the negotiation set is finalized the agents execute the monotonic concession
protocol to select one of the deals from the negotiation set, or the conflict deal if no
deal can be agreed upon.
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Finally, the agents present the selected flight plan to the pilot for approval and
implementation. In the simulations used for this paper the agent was also playing
the role of pilot, so the selected flight plan was simply executed. In real life the pilots
would have some sort of veto power and it is possible that the resulting plan would
also need to be submitted to an overseeing air traffic controller for approval before
implementation.
Conflict Detection
The system implemented uses a simple conflict prediction tool. Nominal state
propagation is used to determine the future location of aircraft using current state
information. On each agent update cycle the current position, speed, and heading of
each other aircraft in the area are used to look 20 minutes into the future. If a conflict
will occur during that time period a conflict resolution process will be initiated. The
model defines a conflict as any overlap of the protected zones of two aircraft. The
protected zone is a cylinder with a 1.5 nautical mile radius and a height of 1000 feet,
centered on the aircraft. The model uses all three dimensions of state information.
During the process of state propagation and conflict detection, the times at which
the impending conflict would begin and end are stored. The first time and last time of
protected zone overlap are used in the process of generating the alternate trajectories
that comprise the negotiation set.
Negotiation Set Generation
When the agent detects that a conflict is going to occur with another aircraft it
uses a predefined process to generate six alternate trajectories. The six prescribed
deviations are left, right, up, down, speed up and slow down. Each pair of opposite
19
trajectories is generated with a given process. In terms of the taxonomy outlined by
Kuchar and Yang, this resolution process allows for climbs, turns, and speed changes,
but not for combinations thereof.
The generation of the left turn, right turn pair (see Figure 2) is based upon
the predicted times of the beginning and end of the conflict. The agent determines
the location it would have occupied at the time the protected zones first would have
overlapped. This point is used to generate two temporary waypoints. At right angles
to the current heading, the aircraft projects three nautical miles to the left and to
the right of the point it would have occupied at the start of the conflict. A similar
procedure is used to generate two waypoints using the position the agent aircraft
would have occupied at the end of the conflict. Finally, a fifth temporary point is
created on the original path several minutes after the conflict would have ended.
This point is the rejoin point and is used by the agent to return to the original path
after the conflict evasion maneuver has been completed. These five waypoints, two
to the left of the original path, the two to the right and the rejoin point, allow two
new trajectories to be defined. The left alternative involves an immediate turn to fly
towards the first left waypoint, to the second left waypoint, and then rejoining the
original path at the rejoin point. Similarly, the right turn alternative is the path from
the current position to the first right waypoint, then to the second right waypoint,
and finally to the rejoin point.
The climb and descend alternatives (Figure 3) also make use of the conflict times
recorded during the conflict prediction step. The climb alternative is comprised of
an immediate climb to an altitude 500 feet above the current altitude. The agent
continues to fly its original course at the new altitude until it passes the point at which
the conflict is over and then descends back to the original altitude. The descend option
is the opposite, in which the agent descends 500 feet and maintains that altitude until
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Left Alternate Trajectory
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Right Alternate Trajectory
Original Course
First Point of Conflict
Last Point of Conflict
? 3 Nautical MileDeviation
Alternate Trajectories
Fig. 2. Generation of left and right alternate trajectories
crossing the end of conflict point and climbing back to the original altitude.
Finally, the speed up and slow down options are generated. They are less com-
plicated and simply require the agent to fly the previously intended path at a slightly
faster or slower speeds, respectively. No other course or altitude changes are required.
A value of 50 knots was arbitrarily chosen for the amount of speed up and slow down
that were used in this model, but this value could easily be altered. It is also likely
that in a real world application of this process this value would be dependent on the
class of aircraft in question.
Once all six options have been generated, the agent processes each one using its
utility function, as described below. This produces a utility score for each potential
conflict resolution. The agent then signals to the other aircraft involved in the poten-
tial conflict. The message includes a request to initiate the negotiation process and
then all of the flight plan data required to completely describe the six alternate tra-
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Climb Alternate Trajectory
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First Point of Conflict
Last Point of Conflict
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Alternate Trajectories
Fig. 3. Generation of climb and descend alternate trajectories
jectories and their associated utility scores. The message concludes with a statement
that all the information has been sent.
Because all of the agents in the simulation are using the same process as described
above, the second agent involved need not wait for the initiation of negotiation mes-
sage to begin generating its course alternatives. The process described above can be
thought of as occurring simultaneously in both affected agents. Similarly, the follow-
ing steps that are taken by an agent after receiving the trajectory alternatives and
their utilities can also be considered to be occurring simultaneously in all parties.
After receiving the trajectory alternatives, the agent pairs them up with its
own generated alternatives. Each received trajectory is paired with each generated
trajectory for a total of 36 potential solutions. In the terminology of the MCP, each of
these 36 trajectory pairs is a deal, and together they form a preliminary negotiation
set.
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There is an additional constraint that must be met, however, before the process
can go forward. In the deal validation step, each of the 36 potential deals must
be checked to determine if it is a viable solution. In order to do this, each deal is
analyzed using a process similar to that used for conflict detection. Nominal state
propagation is applied to each leg of the intended trajectories to determine if the deal
is truly a conflict free solution. Any deal which contains a future conflict is rejected
and discarded from the negotiation set. It should be noted that while this validation
occurs twice, once in each agent that is involved in the conflict, the results obtained
should be symmetric.
The Conflict Deal
As outlined in the discussion of the MCP in chapter 2, a conflict deal should
exist in the negotiation set. This deal serves two purposes. First, it is a baseline for
the calculation of utility scores. The utility of an option for an agent is defined as the
cost of the conflict deal minus the cost of the alternative being evaluated. Second,
the conflict deal provides a fallback that will be used in the event that the negotiation
ends in conflict or does not end at all.
In most multi-agent applications of the MCP the conflict deal is simply taken
to be whatever plans the agents had been operating under prior to the initiation of
the negotiation process. The air traffic domain does not allow for this possibility,
however, as both agents following their initial plans will lead to a violation of the
safety constraints of the system. Special considerations must be made for the conflict
deal in this domain.
In this system, the conflict deal must consist of a conflict free pair of trajectories
that is available to both agents at the start of the negotiation process. There are
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several possibilities for the generation of this deal.
First, prior to the negotiation process the aircraft could contact air traffic control
and obtain the pair of trajectories that air traffic control would have given to the
aircraft in the event that they could not negotiate. This is a poor choice as it does
not allow for the full automation of the process.
Second, the pilots of the aircraft in question could manually communicate at the
start of the negotiation process and determine a pair of conflict free trajectories that
they would be willing to fly and input this into their flight computers. The agreed
upon pair could then be used as a conflict deal for the MCP process. This possibility
significantly adds to the workload of the pilot, however, and is therefore not preferred.
Finally, one of the previously described conflict resolution methods that are based
on worst case analysis could be used by the agents prior to the negotiation process
to determine the fall back conflict deal. Each agent would first run this method to
determine what course it would fly to avoid the other aircraft. The agents would
then exchange these courses and they would form the conflict deal. As these courses
are created using a worst case analysis they can safely be used in the event that
this initial communication cannot be made and the negotiation cannot take place.
This method also preserves the full automation of the process and does not require
pilot intervention until the final agreed upon resolution is presented to the pilot for
implementation.
This final approach is the one used in the system presented here. I have im-
plemented the method discussed by Tomlin, Papas, and Sastry in [14] to use as the
baseline worst case analysis system. The trajectory that is returned from their method
is inserted into the negotiation set as the fall back conflict deal.
24
Utility Functions
In order to make use of the MCP, each agent must have a utility function. This
function is used to encode the agent’s preferences for certain flight plans. The power
of the cooperative negotiation approach comes from these functions. By encoding
preferences for certain flight plan attributes in a utility function, the agents are able
to inject their desires into the conflict resolution process in a way that is not possible
with most standard systems.
Utility functions in the MCP are built on top of cost functions. The utility of a
deal is defined as the reduction in cost of that deal as compared to the conflict deal.
The cost functions themselves are where the preferences are actually encoded. There
has not been extensive work in the air traffic domain dealing with utility functions;
some simple examples were formulated for this work. The important feature of these
functions is not their precise formulation, but the fact that any preference can be
encoded into them. This allows maximal flexibility for the agents to express their
desires for some flight plans over others. Any conceivable function that maps flight
plan data to a number can be used.
Encoding flight plan preferences into the MCP utility functions allows the MCP
to select the deal that is of greatest value to the two agents. The fact that the MCP
takes these agent cost functions into account is what gives it an advantage over non-
cooperative methods. A system which does not incorporate agent preferences can
never satisfy those preferences. The MCP is able to provide solutions which are more
acceptable to all parties due to this feature.
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Negotiation
Once the negotiation set has been determined, the process of selecting a deal
to resolve the conflict can take place. As noted in Chapter 2, there is a short form
of the MCP which requires less communication and can be completed more quickly.
This is accomplished by computing the product of the utilities for each deal in the
negotiation set. The deal with the highest utility product is the deal that would have
been selected by the longer MCP process. In the event that there is a tie between
several deals, the deal with the lowest sum of utilities is selected in order to distribute
the cost as fairly as possible among the agents.
After the agent has selected the deal that would result from the negotiation
process, it exchanges its selection with the other agent. If the selections are identical
then the agents proceed to put the deal into action by altering their flight plans to
the alternate plans agreed upon. If there is a disagreement in the final selection,
which can only happen if there are multiple deals with identical utility products in
the negotiation set, then the agents are deemed to be in conflict and must fall back on
the conflict deal that was previously determined by the non-cooperative analysis, or
the agents (pilots) could elect to appeal to ground controllers for a final deconfliction.
Experiments
The conflict detection and resolution system was evaluated using randomly gen-
erated scenarios. Each scenario consisted of two aircraft whose initial headings and
speeds would cause a conflict. Figure 4 provides a visual overview for the scenario
generation process.
Random scenarios were created with the following process. First, a conflict point
was selected. This point is the location at which the aircraft would sustain a collision
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Random time to
conflict used to
generate start positions
Fig. 4. Random scenario overview
without intervention. Random velocities were selected for the aircraft from a nominal
range. Headings were also randomly generated for the aircraft with the restriction
that they not be within 30◦ of one another. Finally a conflict time was selected. This
number is how many minutes after the start of the scenario the conflict will occur,
and was drawn from the range 10 to 20.
Using the selected headings, velocities, and time, aircraft starting positions were
calculated. The flight plans were completed by creating waypoints on the aircrafts’
headings one hour forward from the starting position.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS, DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Results
Several tests were run to determine the quality and viability of the system pre-
sented. As described in the previous section, a procedure was developed for generating
test scenarios consisting of pairs of aircraft flying towards a conflict. This system was
used to generate hundreds of test cases which were then used as initial conditions for
the simulation.
The most important function performed by any conflict detection and resolution
system is the maintenance of safe separation between the aircraft involved. This
was qualitatively verified by running several hundred trials of randomly generated
scenarios. In these trials the agents were presented with the scenario, negotiated a
resolution, and the resolution was analyzed to verify that no conflict occurred. In all
trials conflict was avoided. The protocol meets the minimum safety standard.
The second goal of the system was increased efficiency through cooperative con-
flict resolution. The efficiency of the system was evaluated using cost functions as
described previously. A number of basic cost parameters were defined and combined
to create cost functions for use in these tests.
D = total distance traveled
∆A = total altitude changes during flight plan
∆H = total heading changes during flight plan
Cost = D (4.1)
Cost = D +∆A (4.2)
28
Cost = D +∆H (4.3)
Cost = D +∆A+∆H (4.4)
Equation 4.1 is the simplest cost function, in which the cost of the flight plan is
equal to the distance in nautical miles that is flown. Equations 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 add
penalties for altitude and heading changes. The altitude penalty is equal to the total
altitude traveled during the flight plan. A plan which includes a 500 foot climb and
1000 foot descent will incur an altitude penalty of 1500. The heading change penalty
is defined similarly. These penalties are intended to capture the desire to minimize
pilot workload and maximize passenger comfort.
Test 1 (see Table I) shows the average results from 100 trials in which both agents
use cost function 1. As expected, when both agents use the same utility function their
results are very similar. Agent 1 averaged a 6.1% improvement and agent 2 averaged
9.3% improvement when comparing the negotiated deals to the conflict deal.
Table I. Summary Results for Evaluation #1
Agent Conflict Cost Negotiated Cost Average Improvement Std. Deviation
1 156.31 146.00 6.1% 5.4%
2 160.04 144.65 9.3% 5.6%
Test 2 (see Table II) shows the results of 100 trials in which agent 1 continued
to use cost function 4.1, but agent 2 used cost function 4.4 which includes all three
penalties. In this test agent 1 showed an average of 8.5% improvement, which is not
statistically different from the result of test 1. Agent 2, however, received a much
greater improvement. This demonstrates that when an agent has strong preferences
for certain solutions the system allows those preferences to be expressed. This is
the primary difference between this system and any non-cooperative solution. The
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negotiation process allows agents to select the plan that suits them the best.
Table II. Summary Results for Evaluation #2
Agent Conflict Cost Negotiated Cost Average Improvement Std. Deviation
1 145.03 143.76 8.5% 6.4%
2 218.01 158.09 27.8% 20.5%
Overall, the tests have borne out the intuition that when agents are allowed to
use cost functions to express preferences they can reach resolutions that are of higher
utility than those provided by non-cooperative methods.
Discussion
The results demonstrate the primary strength of the system I have proposed in
this paper. The agents are able to express preferences for certain types of flight plans
through the use of cost functions. Since the cost function in use by an agent has a
direct impact on the end result of the negotiation process the agent is able to achieve
higher efficiency with this method. Non-cooperative methods lack this feature.
The system is also efficient with respect to the time required to produce a reso-
lution to the conflict. This is very important due to the real-time nature and safety
considerations of the domain. The primary bottleneck in the negotiation process is
the communication between the agents. In particular, the initial exchange of trajec-
tory alternatives is the primary communications load. Subsequent communications
and proposals of deals need only to refer to an deal identifier. In the model proposed,
six initial alternative flight plans must be sent each way. Each flight plan consists
of several pieces of flight segment data including altitude, velocity and destination
waypoints. Each flight plan is also sent with a utility score. In total, each flight plan
requires less than 1 kilobyte of data if it is represented in a compact form. The nego-
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tiation set in the system may have a maximum of 36 deals, and because at least one
agent must concede on any negotiation step that is not the last step, the entire pro-
cess cannot have more than 18 proposals. The total information exchanged between
the two agents will depend on the representations chosen, but there is no reason it
should exceed 50 kilobytes, and would likely be far less.
In practice an air to air communication system is required which can quickly
transmit tens of kilobytes between aircraft. The current ADS-B system is capable of
this, but there is currently a fair bit of debate as to how the system should be and will
be used in the future. Additionally, there are guidelines for the frequency of ADS-B
transmissions which may make it difficult to adapt to the negotiation process. Future
research may well conclude that direct aircraft to aircraft data links are required or
highly desirable for the higher communication load of such protocols.
The complexity of computations performed by this system, while strongly af-
fected by the cost functions that are used, are not typically computationally intensive.
Given the trend towards more and more affordable computer power, even a modestly
complex utility function will be able to be computed very quickly by inexpensive
hardware. This is one area where the cooperative negotiation system has a large
advantage over the more complex optimization systems. This model requires a cost
function to be computed fewer than ten times and a sort of the results. The more
complex systems, such as that described in [5], require significantly more computing
power. The system described in this paper can be run from start to finish, even as-
suming modest processing and communication power, in several seconds. Given that
the system specifies a 20 minute look ahead for conflict detection, this is well within
what would be required for safety. If speed does become a concern due to sub-optimal
communication or processing capabilities then the 20 minute look ahead time can be
extended, but there is a trade off between forecast time and uncertainty, and a longer
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look ahead time will increase the rate of false alarms.
A number of simplifications were made to the problem of conflict detection and
resolution to enable this prototype cooperative system to be developed. In order for
the system to be applied in a real air traffic conflict situation these issues must be
addressed.
The nominal state propagation used for conflict detection in this model is the
simplest method available. The current speed, altitude and heading are used for
simple linear course projections. The cases analyzed were all of such a form that
they were compatible with this model as the aircraft involved were flying straight
line trajectories to specific destination waypoints. The next natural extension to
this is to use intended flight plan information to predict conflicts that are not on
the current flight segment. This is not difficult, and in fact such flight plan state
propagation is already in use in this system: after the initial pairing of trajectory
alternatives, those with conflicts are rejected using this process. The more interesting
issue raised by using flight plan propagation in the conflict detection step is how to
handle conflicts that occur very close to an intended course change. A much more
sophisticated alternate trajectory generation process would be required to handle
this elegantly. The system currently in use adds an out of route deviation and then
returns the aircraft to the original flight segment. In the case of a conflict occurring
near an intended course change, this could result in highly inefficient flight plans,
and perhaps recurring conflicts between the same two aircraft. One possible solution
could be to ignore the current waypoint in the trajectory generation process if the
aircraft is within some threshold distance of it. The threshold should be chosen based
on the distance the aircraft would travel during the conflict resolution maneuver itself.
This avoids the problem of the conflict resolution taking the aircraft past an intended
waypoint and forcing it to return. Instead, the alternate trajectories would be based
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on a course directly from the current position to the next waypoint after the current
one in the flight plan sequence.
Another simplification made to the process is in the generation of alternate tra-
jectories. In the system proposed, each aircraft creates a set of potential course
deviations and sends them to the other party in the negotiation process. Each agent
then pairs each of its own trajectories with each of the trajectories received from the
other agent. This is a viable solution, but has room for improvement.
First, there is no guarantee that any of the 36 resulting trajectory pairs will
resolve the conflict. Given the set of prescribed course deviations, this is unlikely, but
not explicitly prevented by the process.
Second, this solution is somewhat wasteful. The trajectories that an agent pairs
with those received from its negotiation partner may not be the preferred responses
to the suggested course deviations.
Applying more advanced motion planning tactics to this step would resolve both
issues. Instead of mindlessly pairing the generated trajectories with those that are
received, a specific response to each trajectory should be generated. For each proposed
course deviation the location of the other aircraft is well known and can be used to
plot a conflict free response. This response could then be optimized with respect to
the agent’s own cost function. This will guarantee a conflict free deal and increase
the utility of the deal. This method does, however, come at the price of increased
complexity and increased computational requirements.
Finally, the largest simplification made by this model is that only pairwise con-
flicts are considered. Many conflict resolution systems currently do not handle multi-
ple conflicts, but as noted by Kuchar and Yang, there are cases that can be constructed
in which simple chaining of pairwise conflict resolutions is not sufficient.
For cooperative solutions this presents a particularly difficult problem. Increasing
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the number of participants in a negotiation beyond two significantly increases the
complexity. It is no longer possible to receive the proposed trajectories from one other
agent and construct conflict free responses. One possibility for the deal generation
would be to have the agents take turns as follows: for a three party negotiation,
there would be three cycles. On the first cycle, agent A would propose trajectory
alternatives and broadcast them. Agent B would then construct conflict free preferred
responses and broadcast them. Finally, agent C would be able to construct responses
that take both A and B’s trajectories into account. Then the process would begin
again with B proposing the initial set of trajectories. At the end of the process there
would be a set of possible deals that have been somewhat fairly generated.
The process of a multi-party negotiation is difficult as well. It is not clear if the
basic MCP process can be extended to multiple parties simultaneously proposing and
subsequently conceding or holding firm. Intuitively, it seems that the process should
work, if on each step one agent is allowed to hold firm and the others must concede.
Whether this results in an optimal result remains to be seen.
Conclusion
As air travel continues to increase in popularity and technology continues to ad-
vance, Free Flight will become both more necessary and more practical. These trends
create the need for more efficient and autonomous conflict detection and resolution
processes.
In this thesis I have proposed that cooperative multi-agent negotiation techniques
can be brought to bear on the CD&R problem. This is an important deviation from
the existing research in the domain, which has largely avoided cooperative solutions.
I have outlined a number of the issues which must be approached in order to apply
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these multi-agent negotiation techniques to this problem and presented one possible
implementation. The system was shown to be viable, as it successfully prevents
conflicts from occurring. Additionally, the system was demonstrated to improve the
efficiency of the resolution process by allowing agents to express their preferences
through cost functions which directly influence the resulting conflict free trajectory
pair.
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